This paper presents a hierarchical game to model distributed joint power and channel allocation for multi-carrier energy efficient systems. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. Interestingly, we show that, under some assumptions, introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in a multi-carrier system induces a natural coordination pattern where users have incentive to choose their transmitting carriers in such a way that they always transmit on orthogonal channels. Such an important result offers insights into how to design hierarchy in multi-carrier environments. Analytical results are provided to assess the gap between the non-cooperative game with synchronous decision makers and the proposed Stackelberg game performances mainly in terms of spectrum utilization. We exemplify our general analysis by investigating the possibility of applying such a model to cognitive radio network environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen increasing efforts towards designing greener networking infrastructure by improving energy efficiency of end-hosts, data centers, and the cloud operations.
Multi-carrier transmission has become one of the hottest topics in wireless communications.
After its adoption in digital audio and video broadcasting systems standards in the 1980s, this transmission technique appears now in several recent wireless communications systems standards such as LTE and WiMax. For all these reasons multi-carrier systems have the great potential in tackling one of the major challenge of future communication systems: how to guarantee the transition towards global substantiality, including economic issues and energy efficiency?
In this work, we consider hierarchy in multi-carrier wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel. The network is said to be decentralized in the sense that the receiver does not dictate to the users their transmit power levels. Hence, each user can choose freely his power control policy in order to selfishly maximize a certain individual performance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in the context of game theoretic studies. Unlike many works concerning this problem, the chosen users' utility is not the transmission rate (e.g. [1] , [2] ) but the energy-efficiency of their communications.
Indeed, motivated by the facts that mobile terminals have a limited battery life and not the transmission rate. In the literature, energy-efficient power control game has been first proposed by Goodman et al. in [3] for flat fading channels and recently re-used by [9] for multi-carrier CDMA (code division multiple access) systems and linear receivers.
The multi-dimensional nature of users' strategies and the non-quasi-concavity of the energy efficiency function make the multi-carrier problem much more challenging than the singlecarrier or throughput-based-utility case. In this work, we consider a hierarchical multipleaccess multi-carrier system in which both leaders and followers wish to selfishly maximize their utility by means of adequately choosing their transmit powers over the carriers. A main challenge of applying the idea of hierarchical games in the multi-carrier context is that the followers should observe the leaders' decisions and be able to coordinate their actions in order to transmit on vacant carriers. Following the above trend, we explore a Stackelberg energy efficiency game framework and analyze how users behave in the presence of hierarchy.
As mentioned in [3] the Nash equilibrium (NE) in such games can be very energy inefficient. In the same context, [7] proposed, for multiple access channels with flat fading links and single-user decoding, a pricing mechanism to obtain improvements in the users' utilities with respect to the case with no pricing. Note that the Stackelberg formulation arises naturally in some context of practical interests. For example, this hierarchy is naturally present in contexts where there are primary (licensed) users and secondary (unlicensed) users who can sense their environment because there are equipped with a cognitive radio [10] . It is also natural if the users access to the medium in an asynchronous manner. Note that there have been many works on Stackelberg games, even in the context of cognitive radio [11] , but they do not consider energy-efficiency for the individual utility as defined in [3] , [9] , [12] . They rather consider transmission rate-type utilities (see e.g. [2] , [13] , [14] ).
In this paper, we introduce the hierarchy concept in multi-carrier energy efficient systems.
Specifically, we consider different hierarchical levels among the users, i.e., some users' decision priority is higher/lower than the others. It is easy to see that this hierarchy concept can be directly applied to the cognitive radio networks, where primary users can act in the most efficient way, taking into account the behaviors and impacts of secondary users. In Section VIII, we will exemplify our general analysis by investigating the possibility of applying such a model to cognitive radio networks. As we will see, it is shown in this paper that there exists a natural coordination between the users where, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, only one user transmits on one given carrier. Such an accurate system modeling presents a key to understand the actual benefits brought by the multi-carrier energy efficient system capabilities.
The original contributions of this paper are threefold:
• Introducing hierarchy concept in power control game for energy efficient multi-carrier systems,
• Characterizing completely and analytically the Stackelberg equilibria and compare the results obtained in the proposed hierarchical game with those obtained in the noncooperative game in [9] ,
• Our main result is that we always obtain an equilibrium (contrary to the work addressed in [9] ) where, for the most general cases, users transmit on distinct carriers delivering a binary channel assignment. For implementation purposes in a cognitive radio network, the follower (or secondary user) has only to reliably sense the spectral environment (and not the leader's transmit power as it is the case in the single carrier context in [6] ) and then decides to transmit only on the best carrier left idle by the leader.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The general system model is provided in Sec. II. Sec. III defines the energy efficiency framework and Sec. IV reviews the noncooperative game and presents the hierarchical game problem. Then, in Sec. V we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium. To gain more understanding on the addressed issues we focus in Sec. VI on the two-user case study, for which we derive the Stackelberg equilibria depending on the channel gains of users. The performance analysis in terms of spectrum use and especially the property of spectrum coordination between users is discussed in Sec. VII.
Sec. VIII provides a use case study in a cognitive radio network for the proposed scheme.
Sec. IX provide numerical results to illustrate and validate the theoretical results derived in the previous sections. Additional comments and conclusions are provided in Sec. X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a decentralized multiple access channel with an arbitrary number of users, which is denoted by N. We assume that the users transmit their data over block Rayleigh flat fading channels and that the receiver knows on each block the channel gains (coherent communication assumption) whereas each transmitter has only access to the knowledge of his own channel. The latter assumption is realistic in systems where the uplink-downlink channel reciprocity is valid or if a reliable feedback mechanism is available. The equivalent baseband signal received by the base station can be written as
where h k n stands for the block fading process of user n on the sub-band k, x k n is the signal transmitted by user n on the sub-band k and z k n is the additive Gaussian noise at the kth subband. We denote by g n = |h n | 2 the fading channel gain which is assumed to stay constant over each block fading length (i.e. coherent communication). The assumption of coherent reception is reasonable if the fading is slow in the sense that the receiver is able to track the channel variations. We statistically model the channel gains g n to be i.i.d distributed over the N Rayleigh fading coefficients and E g 2 ) for n = 1, ..., N. For any user n ∈ {1, ..., N} the received signal-to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR) is expressed as
It follows from the above SINR expression that the strategy chosen by a user affects the performance of other users in the network through multiple-access interference.
III. NETWORK ENERGY-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Our system model is based on the seminal paper [3] that defines the energy efficiency framework. To pose the power control problem as a non-cooperative game, we first need to define a utility function suitable for data applications. SINR is a critical parameter for the quality of service (QoS) of the signal transmission, as it directly determines the bit error rate, which is closely related to the data throughput (average rate of successful packet delivery). In brief, when SINR is very low, data transmission results in massive errors and the throughput tends to 0; when SINR is very high, data transmission becomes error-free and the throughput grows asymptotically to a constant. However, achieving a high SINR level requires the user terminal to transmit at a high power, which in turn results in low battery life. This phenomenon can be concisely captured by an increasing, continuous and S-shaped "efficiency" function f (·), which measures the packet success rate. Therefore, the throughput of user n over carrier k can be expressed as
where R n and γ k n are respectively the transmission rate and the SINR of user n over carrier k. We also require that to ensure that u n = 0 when p n = 0. On the other hand, increasing the transmit power clearly favors the packet success rate and therefore the throughput. However, as the packet success rate tends to one, further increasing the power can lead to marginal gains in terms of throughput regarding the amount of extra power used. The following utility function allows one to measure the corresponding tradeoff between the transmission benefit (totoal throughput over the K carriers) and cost (total power over the K carriers):
The utility function u n that has units of bits per joule perfectly captures the tradeoff between throughput and battery life and is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency is crucial. It should be noted that the throughput in (3) could be replaced with any increasing concave function as long as we make sure that u n (0, . . . , 0) = 0. It can be shown that for a sigmoidal efficiency function, the utility function in (4) is a quasi-concave function of the user's transmit power [4] . This is also true if the throughput in (3) is replaced with an increasing concave function of γ k n .
IV. THE GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION

A. The non-cooperative game problem
An important solution concept of the game under consideration is the Nash equilibrium (NE) [5] , which is a fundamental concept in non-cooperative strategic games. It is a vector of strategies (or actions in our case)
N , one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change his strategy, i.e., u n (p
n , where the −n subscript on vector p stands for "except user n", i.e., p −n = {p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n+1 , . . . , p N }. In the case of hierarchical single-carrier game, it has been shown that there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium [6] . In [3] and [7] authors showed that, under certain conditions, the NE of the game with utility (4) exists.
From now on, we will only consider the case of two-users (one leader and one follower) subject to mutual interference. Although its simplicity, this scheme allows us to address the problem of hierarchically allocating transmit power in multi-carrier systems and gain insights into how to design power control strategies in a multi-carrier environment.
B. The hierarchical game formulation
There are many motivations for studying wireless networks with hierarchical structures, but the most important ones are to improve the network efficiency and modeling aspect.
The Stackelberg game has been firstly proposed in economic problem and also in biology for modeling optimal behaviors against nature [8] . It is in fact a mechanism for wireless networks in which some wireless nodes are equipped with cognitive sensors and can sense the activities of others, but some other nodes cannot. This is also a natural setting for cognitive wireless networks, where users have access to the medium in an asynchronous manner. For example, primary (licensed) users have priority to access the medium and then secondary (unlicensed) users access the medium after sensing the environment (see Sec. VIII for more details). At the core lies the idea that the utility of the leader obtained at the Stackelberg equilibrium is better than his utility obtained at the Nash equilibrium when the two users play simultaneously. It has been proved in [6] that this result is also true for the follower. The goal is then to find a Stackelberg equilibrium in this two-step game. It is noteworthy that if there exists a Nash equilibrium in a game, there exists at most one Stackelberg equilibrium.
In this work, we consider a Stackelberg game framework in which the leader decides first his power allocation vector p 1 = (p 1 1 , . . . , p K 1 ) and based on this value, the follower will adapt his power allocation vector
. Throughout the paper we will denote by U c the utility function where subscript c is F for the follower and L for the leader.
Definition 1. (Stackelberg equilibrium): A vector of actions
is called Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) if and only if:
and p 2 = p 2 ( p 1 ).
A Stackelberg equilibrium can be determined using a bi-level approach. First, given the action of the leader, we compute the best-response function of the follower (the function p 2 (·)), i.e. the action of the follower which maximizes his utility given the action of the leader. We characterize this best-response function by using a result from [9] . Define the effective channel gain as the ratio between the SINR and the transmission power for the follower over the k th carrier. This depends on the power used by the leader on carrier k through the following expression:
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
We first determine the best-response function of the follower depending on the action of the leader. This result comes directly from Proposition 1 of [9] . For making this paper sufficiently self-contained, we review here the latter proposition.
A. The follower's power allocation vector
Proposition 1. Given the power allocation vector p 1 of the leader, the best-response of the follower is given by
with
Equation (6) has a unique solution if the efficiency function f (·) is sigmoidal [4] , and we will use this assumption throughout our paper. The last proposition says that the best-response of the follower is to use only one carrier, the one such that the effective channel gain is the best.
B. The leader's power allocation vector
Let us now study the optimal allocation for the leader knowing the best-response of the follower. Let k denote the "best" carrier of the leader, i.e. k = arg max
A necessary and sufficient condition on the follower' channel gains such that the best-response function of the follower is to transmit over a different carrier than the leader is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. At the Stackelberg equilibrium, if the leader transmits over only one carrier, the follower transmits over another carrier if and only if:
where γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order Equation (6) .
For the clarity of the exposition, proofs are given in the Appendix. This condition implies that all the carriers are almost homogeneous, i.e. a given user experiences approximately the same radio conditions over his carriers. Denote that this is typically the case in wireless systems [15] . Given this proposition, we are able to determine the best action of the leader, and then to deduce the Stackelberg equilibrium. The following proposition gives the optimal power control of the leader knowing the best-response of the follower at the Stackelberg equilibrium. Typically, it is proven that the optimal allocation of the leader is also to use only one carrier.
Proposition 3. (First main result): At the Stackelberg equilibrium, when the channel gains of the follower satisfy (7), the power allocation vector p 1 for which the leader's utility is maximized is unique and is given by
Proposition 3 says that the utility of leader is maximized when it transmits only over its best carrier. Accordingly, we observe that the carrier which do not contribute enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused by the follower's transmission is switched "off". In order to show this important result we will proceed through the following propositions and analysis. Notice that, although we limit our analysis to the two-carrier case, we emphasize that this is not a restriction of the results presented throughout the paper.
VI. THE CASE OF TWO CARRIERS
In this section, we provide a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium for all different cases illustrated in 3. This is done for a two carrier system, i.e. K = 2, in order to provide insights to best understand the actual benefits brought by hierarchy compared to results obtained in the non-cooperative framework in [9] . Note that, in this case, the condition described in Equation (7) becomes:
The power allocation vector of the leader is
. Proposition 1 claims that there are two regions which depend on the leader power allocation such that the best-response of the follower is different. Below we define the two regions: 
}.
In region A, we have that h 
).
In region B, we have that h 
Based on the above equations, we can compute the explicit expression of the leader's SINR on each carrier for both regions, namely
It follows that the utility function of the leader given by Equation (4) for region A can be expressed as
Similarly, in region B, the leader' utility function is
Without loss of generality, the analysis is given only for region A. Similar approach can be adopted for region B. We first derive the utility of the leader U 
and after some simple simplifications, we obtain that
We shall look for a couple (p 
with γ
The solutions of the above system are given by
and
Next, we shall show that, under some given assumptions, p he will transmit at his maximum power, which is also an equilibrium. In this paper, for sake of clarity, we will only consider the most interesting (and non-trivial) regime where the transmit powers are less than their maximal levels but all the results provided in this paper easily extend to the case of finite powers. In this regime, even if a user has an infinite transmit power he will not necessarily use all of it.
We have seen in Prop. 1 that the best-response function of the follower depends on the allocation powers of the leader and the channel gains. In this setting, we will present in the next proposition under which conditions the leader transmits on a given carrier at the stackelberg equilibrium. Specifically, we will show that, at extreme cases (i.e., when a given user experiences very different channel gains on his two carriers), the two players may choose to transmit on the same carrier at the Stackelberg equilibrium. In this case, both users prefer to transmit on the same carrier as this contributes enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused by the mutual transmission.
A. Extreme Cases
In a Stackelberg game, if the leader decides to play his Nash action, then the follower plays the Nash action too, as it is the best-response to the Nash action itself. Then, depending on the ratio
of the leader channel gains, it could be interesting for him to transmit over the same channel than the follower.
Proposition 4. In region A (resp. B), at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader and the follower transmit on the first (resp. second) carrier if:
In the extreme case of region A (
, the leader decides to transmit on the same carrier (second one here) as the second carrier is very good compared to the first one.
In the extreme case of region B (
, the channel gain is very bad on the second carrier with respect to the one on the first carrier and then both users choose to transmit on the first carrier. Note that, in this case, the follower and the leader transmit over the same carrier using an optimal power allocation given by the Stackelberg model proposed in [6] .
This extreme case on the channel gains where the two players transmit over the same channel is not realistic. Indeed, it is usually assumed that channel gains on different carriers for a given user are correlated with a correlation factor close to 1, i.e. the different carriers are approximately the same for a given user at a certain time.
B. Non-extreme case
From now on, we assume that different carriers for the leader or the follower are not in these extreme conditions, namely
with γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order Equation (6) . For the case of Rayleigh fading channels, the probability of being in the non-extreme case is given by
where ψ(γ * ) stands for the probability to be in the extreme case, namely Fig. 2 depicts the probability of being in the non-extreme case where we assume that the processing gain is sufficiently large so that when the two users transmit over the same channel, the SINR γ * can be achieved (i.e., γ * < 1). In particular, it is shown that the probability of being in the non-extreme case is always more than 0.5. As the SINR γ * increases, the extreme region shrinks resulting in an increase of the non-extreme case probability. At γ * = 1, the non-extreme case probability reaches 1 since the extreme region completely disappear. We will show in next that this probability gives in fact the probability that users transmit on distinct carriers.
We shall now look at the problem of the existence and the uniqueness of the vector of transmit power levels for the leader. A solution to these issues is stated through the following propositions. 
Proposition 5. (Existence of a SE): At the Stackelberg equilibrium in region
which means that the maximum utility over region A is given by
We now shall determine the power p 
Proposition 7. The utility of the leader over region A is maximized when the leader transmits with the power
where γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order equation (6) .
Within region B, we have the same analysis which yields that
yielding that the maximum utility within region B is given by
We have the similar result for the utility of the leader over region B. 
Proposition 8. The utility of the leader over region B is maximized when the leader transmits with the power
Using the two previous propositions, we get the first main result in Prop. 3. Indeed, if the channel gains of the followers satisfy condition (7) the optimization of the leader's utility becomes
as f is a strictly increasing function.
VII. SPECTRUM COORDINATION
Prop. 1 and Prop. 3 suggest that both the follower and the leader transmit on only one carrier depending on their channel gains. In the next proposition we will show that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in a multi-carrier system induces a natural coordination pattern where users have incentive to choose their transmitting carriers in such a way that they always transmit on orthogonal channels.
Proposition 9. (Second main result): In the non-extreme case, introducing hierarchy between users in a multicarrier energy efficient power control game "pushes" users to coordinate their actions in such a way that they always transmit on different carriers.
To show this important result, we will determine the Stackelberg equilibria of the game depending on the channel gains given conditions derived in the previous section. As far as the proposed hierarchical model is concerned, the SE can be computed by considering the two following cases:
A. Homogeneous Case
In the homogeneous case, the follower experiences approximately the same radio conditions over his two carriers (i.e., channel gains satisfy condition (7)). Then the following holds about the Stackelberg equilibrium:
• (a) If
The Stackelberg equilibrium is then given by
,
σ 2 . Then the Stackelberg equilibrium is
B. Heterogeneous Case
In the heterogeneous case, condition (7) is no more satisfied. The following holds about the SE:
e., the follower experiences deep fade on his second carrier compared to his first carrier),
, 0 .
-(ii) else,
> 1, the power allocation vector of the leader at the Stackelberg equilibrium is
otherwise.
where condition (16) is
The follower transmits on the carrier which is left idle by the leader if condition (16) is not satisfied.
In this case
If condition (16) is satisfied, we have the following best-response for the follower:
, because the effective channel gains are equal for both carriers, i.e., h
σ 2 . Then the bestresponse is not unique in this case and the two players can use the same carrier, the first one here.
As the follower plays after observing the action of the leader, the follower can decide, for optimizing spectrum utilization, to transmit over the carrier left idle by the leader. Moreover, the follower's power is inversely proportional to the channel gain over the second carrier. Then, it is more convenient for him to transmit over this second carrier.
• (b) If
1+γ * (i.e., the follower experiences deep fade on his first carrier compared to his second carrier), we have the similar results:
< 1, the power control vector of the leader at the Stackelberg equilibrium is
where condition (17) is
(17)
The follower transmits on the carrier which is left idle by the leader if condition (17) is not satisfied.
If condition (17) is satisfied, we have the following best-response for the follower:
because the effective channel gains are equal for both carriers, i.e., h
Then the bestresponse is not unique in this case and the two players can use the same carrier, the second one here.
In this particular case, the follower can decide to transmit over the first carrier in order to optimize the spectrum utilization. Again, as the follower's power is inversely proportional to the channel gain on the first carrier, it is more convenient for him to transmit over this first carrier.
A global overview of the occupation of the carriers at the Stackelberg equilibrium, as function of the ratios is depicted in Figure (3) . One of the main contribution of our paper is that we have proved the existence of an equilibrium when a mobile can observe the action of the other before deciding his own action, whatever the channel gains are. This result is not true in the case when the two players play a Nash equilibrium (see [9] ).
VIII. APPLICATION TO COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
Stackelberg game formulation can be seen as one possible approach for modeling wireless networks where some wireless devices are equipped with cognitive sensors and can thus sense the activities of others, but some other nodes cannot. This is also a natural setting for cognitive wireless networks, where users have access to the medium in an asynchronous manner. For example, primary users (leaders) have priority to access the medium and then secondary users (followers) access the medium after sensing the environment. At the core lies the idea that spectrum utilization can be improved by allowing cognitive users to access a spectrum hole unoccupied by the primary user.
In the current hierarchical model, Prop. 9 claims that as long as we are not in the extreme case, a cognitive user transmits over a certain frequency band in order to reach SINR γ * (solution of the unique (positive) solution of the first order Equation (6)) only when no primary user does. This enables public access to the new spectral ranges without sacrificing the transmission quality of the actual license owners. Typically, the primary user comes first in the system, estimates his channel gains (g k 1 ) over all carriers and adapts his transmit power using Prop. 3 depending on the region where channel gains are as illustrated in Fig. 3 . The second user comes in the system randomly, for instance in a Poisson process manner and estimates his channel links (g k 2 ) over all carriers. Such an assumption could be further justified by the fact that in an asynchronous context, the probability that two users decide to transmit at the same moment is negligible as the number of users is limited.
Thus, within this setting, the primary user is assumed to be oblivious to the presence of the secondary user.
The leader communicates with his BS while the cognitive user listen to the wireless channel and determines which part of the spectrum is unused by the leader. Then the secondary user adapts his transmit power to fill detected voids in the spectrum using Prop. 1 in an overlay fashion. Accordingly, in order to determine which part of the spectrum is unused, cognitive user has just to detect the received signal from the primary user. Many techniques were developed in order to detect the holes in the spectrum band. Focusing on each narrow band, existing spectrum sensing techniques such as energy detection [18] and feature detection [17] are particularly suitable for such an overlay system.
IX. SIMULATION RESULTS
To go further with the analysis, we resort to numerical examples. We consider the energy efficiency function proposed in most papers dealing with power allocation games that is f (x) = (1 − e −x ) M , where M = 100
is the block length in bits. In Figure 3 we consider static channel gains g the leader is to use one carrier, the first one here. Considering those variables, the unique solution of Equation (6) is γ * = 6.4. We have where the leader transmits on the first carrier and the follower on the second carrier. We observe on Figure 3 that the Stackelberg equilibrium obtained theoretically is correct, namely In Figure 4 , we change the channel gain of the second carrier for the follower, i.e. g (16) is satisfied. We are thus in the case where for both users the first carrier is the best one. In particular, the leader transmits on the first carrier with power p 
X. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed in this paper the impact of hierarchically allocating transmit power in energy-efficient multi-carrier systems. By hierarchical we mean that some transmitters are able to sense their environment before taking their decisions on the power allocation vector where others cannot. This framework is particularly suitable for an overlay system like spectrum pooling [16] or cognitive radio networks [10] . Interestingly, contrary to results in [9] , we have first obtained the existence of an equilibrium whatever the channel gains of each player are. Second, we have obtained a spectrum coordination property in the case of homogeneous channel gains (which is generally assumed in realistic scenarios), in which at the equilibrium, followers operate on the best idle carrier of the leader. Indeed, we have proved that there is only one case where the two players transmit on the same carrier; when for both players one carrier has a very good channel gain compared to other carriers. Finally, one important task in the context of cognitive radio networks, the proposed model leads that, even if we are working on a power control mechanism, the follower (or the cognitive user) has only to has only to reliably detect the carrier used by the leader (or the primary user) and not the leader's transmit power as it is the case in the single carrier context in [6] ). Such an accurate and efficient modeling of the power control game problem is a key to understand the actual benefits brought by multi-carrier energy efficient systems. 
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: Assume that the leader transmits over one channel, says channel i. Then, the allocation vector of the leader is p 1 = (0, . . . , p i 1 , . . . , 0).
• If the follower does not transmit on the carrier i, i.e. L 2 (p 1 ) = j = i. Then, we have that p where γ * is the unique (positive) solution of the first order Equation (6) . Then, we have proved that the condition (7) is sufficient.
• If condition (7) is satisfied it means that there exists a carrier j such that g (1+γ * ) . Then, we assume that the follower transmits over i, which means that:
Suppose that the two players transmit over channel i and the power used by the leader at the Stackelberg equilibrium is higher compared to the case when a user is alone on a carrier [6] . Then, the power p But this is in contradiction with the assumption that the follower transmits over channel i, then the follower does not transmit over channel i, the one chosen by the leader. We then have proved the sufficient condition.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: We prove this proposition considering only the area A as it is the same idea for the other area. It is preferable for the leader to transmit over the same carrier than the follower, the second one in this area, if and only if the utility at the Stackelberg equilibrium when the leader and the follower transmit on the second carrier is higher than the utility of the leader when he is alone to transmit over the first carrier.
The maximum utility for the leader, in the region A, when he is alone to transmit over the first carrier is given by:
